(This chapter is strongly indebted to Sissela Bok's Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, Pantheon, 1978, an excellent survey of the philosophic backgrounds and moral issues.)

Sorting out what is not deceptive often helps to clarify some issues and to focus on the problem areas. If we can reach agreement on what isn't deceptive, we need not waste time and effort arguing about the wrong issues. Many of the current debates about deceptive advertising and political lying can be simplified by a systematic sorting out process.

Some Basic Sorting

To clarify, it helps to use a simple branching diagram to show some of the options: the information conveyed could be true or not-true; if the information is not-true, the speaker may not-know (an error) or may know; if the speaker knows the information is not-true, there may be no intent to deceive (a fiction) or an intent to deceive (a deception); a deception can be made explicitly in a statement (a lie), or implicitly, by some kind of suggestion or evasion.

The diagram below represents these four options. Not diagrammed here, but discussed later in the chapter, are such issues as the effectiveness of deception, the purposes and results, good intentions, white lies, paternalism, and the credibility gap. First, the basic diagram:

A "lie," for example, is usually defined as "a statement or assertion of something known or believed by the speaker to be untrue with intent to deceive." This diagram helps clarify by distinguishing lies from errors, fictions, and implied deceptions.

In everyday usage, a common cause of confusion is a shifting definition of the word lying. Sometimes this word is used very broadly, as a synonym for deception. Usually we do this when other people are vaguely deceptive or are evading a direct answer, and we call them "liars" - a strong attack word. But, when we are evading a direct answer, we often use the more restricted definition of lying, limiting lying to explicit verbal statements. We are prompt to assert our innocence: "I didn't say that . . . I never said that. "

When the word lie is used here, it will be very restricted and precise, limited to explicit verbal statements. Deception is the wider category which includes all kinds of nonverbal messages and implications.

Before we leave this branching diagram, note how it can be applied to common excuses. If a person is caught in a lie, the standard defense is to plead the lesser offense, to shift across the border to safer areas. Note how each of the common excuses illustrated below shifts away from the more serious charge of lying.

However, because people are social animals, society counterbalances this advantage by placing strong injunctions (laws, penalties, guilt) against deception. Very strong injunctions are placed by both church and state against aggressive deception; lesser penalties apply and more loopholes are available when deception is used in self-defense.

If we choose the advantage of deception, society counterbalances, and we run the risk of other penalties. One of these penalties, for most people, is the sense of guilt, shame, embarrassment, or uneasiness when they tell a lie or are deceptive.

Frequently, the guilt and anxiety are shown in certain behaviors such as blushing, sweating, stammering, averting the eyes, which some times accompany lies and deception by some people. So, in one way, there are some cues which tip-off a lie.

However, not all people react this way. Psychopathic liars with little social concern are less likely to show such behaviors than people who have been raised with a strong social and rigid religious upbringing. Lie detectors and voice-stress analyzers and other devices which claim to measure truthfulness have limited effectiveness. Although some popular books about nonverbal communication have claimed that we can learn to "read" the nonverbal cues and know when people are lying, the serious scholars in this research do not make such unqualified claims. The cluster of cues we normally associate with lying and deception can also have other causes, and some people can deceive without any external tips.

Any person can deceive, or be deceived. Everyone is able to lie and to deceive. But some people are "better" liars than others, that is, some people are more effective in deceiving others, in having their lies accepted by others. On the receiving end, some people are more gullible, more naive than others; some people are more likely to be deceived than others. The effectiveness of deception depends both on the senders and receivers. In actual practice, few people are extremely deceptive or extremely gullible. Degree is important here. In different situations, we're apt to have greater or lesser degrees of gullibility or deception.

The potential for deception is greater today than in the past, simply because of the mass media which allows instant access to millions of people and which takes away some of the natural defenses against deception, some of those nonverbal cues or "leakage" which would tip off some deception, A commercial or political advertisement can simply edit out, in a videotaped presentation, any unwanted or unfavorable images.

Political leaders and business leaders often bemoan the "credibility gap" today, the fact that people are becoming more skeptical of information sent to them by these leaders. But, such growing distrust of the professional persuaders may well be a very reasonable response: reducing the degree of blind-faith acceptance of incoming messages may well be a survival behavior countering the increased potential for deception.

Lies and deceptions, generally speaking, are not illegal. Most of the lies told in this world are among family and friends and acquaintances, and there are only a relatively few situations in which laws prohibit deceptions. Usually such laws are concerned with social interactions where money is involved (fraudulent misrepresentation in business transactions) or a public trust (official documents, legal witnesses). Such situations are so rare that the occasions are usually marked by a visible social gesture: a public oath with raised hand, a signed certificate, a notarized statement affirming the truth.

Under oath we swear to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. " The spirit of the law can be followed; the literal letter cannot: there is no way to convey the "whole truth." This poetic phrasing is an encouragement to full disclosure, not a statement of an attainable reality.

For centuries, common law tradition has focused on the intent to deceive as an important element in determining fraudulent misrepresentation. In contrast to this, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which has been empowered to stop "deceptive advertising," does not have to prove intent, but the ability or capacity to deceive. Such a distinction made it easier to define or identify a "deceptive" ad simply by the opinion or judgment of the Commissioners, but the FTC was severely limited in enforcement and penalties.

Basically, there was a tradeoff. The FTC got some reasonable flexibility in defining deception, but didn't get the power to send someone to jail or to levy fines. The basic FTC penalty was a "cease and desist" order which prohibited the ad from appearing, without charging the violators with illegal acts. In practice, an ad campaign could run its course before the necessary legal action could get it stopped. In some cases, legal appeals delayed the process for ten or fifteen years, while the deceptive ads kept appearing.

Misunderstanding the limitations of the FTC can cause people to have a false illusion of security. Because most people are vaguely aware of the general intention of the laws to prohibit deceptive advertising, some people assume that the government protects them from all deception: "It must be true, or else the government wouldn't allow it on TV!"

This is not so. No matter what laws are on the books, it's almost impossible to stop fraud and deception. Consider the history of the Postal Service which has been trying to enforce the laws against hard-core mail frauds: con games, swindles, chain letters, Pans schemes, etc. Despite their efforts of surveillance and enforcement, every year Americans will lose more than $50 million dollars to the same old hard-core frauds. Laws alone do not protect.

Instead of trying to catch crooks, after the fact, today the general trend of the FTC is toward preventative measures. During the 1970s, consumerist reforms were reflected in new experiments by the FTC designed to reduce deceptive advertising: requirements to substantiate claims, encouragement of comparative advertising, and use of "corrective" ads. Perhaps the most influential reforms are going on unnoticed by the general public: the setting up of "industry guidelines" suggesting, in advance, what the FTC would consider deceptive if it were to be used.

Such suggestions do not have the force of law, but they do keep many advertisers away from the borderlines. Such voluntary restraint and self regulation will not deter someone who is bent on deception. But these guidelines have shown their usefulness already in helping to clarify some complex problems about the legality of some deceptions and lies.

Religious precepts cover much broader ground and define many more lies as "sins." Moralists are often concerned with the degrees of seriousness of lying, ranging from "venial sins" for lesser offenses (fibs) to "mortal sins" for serious lies and deceptions.

Secular social sanctions, too, are very strong against lying and deception. We condemn duplicity and mendacious behavior; there are strong feelings against someone who is two-faced or a double-dealer.

If any statement can be a lie, intended to deceive, consider some of the ways this can be expressed
using the four-part pattern of aggressive behaviors:

	People can lie to intensify their own "good." Call this a "false claim." Advertisers, for example, can make false claims about products.
	People can lie to intensify others' "bad." Call this a "false charge," or a "false witness," or a "calumny." Such aggressive lying has the strongest social and religious prohibitions against it, probably because of the potential harm done to others. To malign someone is against the law (slander and libel), and has strong religious injunctions against it. "Thou shall not bear false witness against thy neighbor. "
	People can lie to downplay their own "bad." People can explicitly deny something. (Different from passive omission, evasions, or other implicit deceptions).
	People can lie to downplay others' "good." People can explicitly deny the "good" of others. (Different from passive neglect).

Most people would agree that we can intensify either with or without an intent to deceive: truths, lies, deceptions, or errors can be repeated; things can be associated together truthfully, deceptively, or erroneously; truths or lies can be well-composed. There's no necessary relation between the techniques used and the intent.

However, some difficult questions occur with downplaying. Some people may believe that downplaying is deceptive in itself, or that evasions are intrinsically deceptive.

Although it is true that the intent to deceive may be more common and probable, it is not intrinsic or necessarily related to the techniques of downplaying.

While some omissions may be intended to deceive, we do recognize that omissions can also occur without the intent to deceive -- through accidental error or because of our subjective focusing on some things, omitting others. So also, confusion can be an unintentional error. Diversion is difficult to explain as an accident or error, because it seems that when one diverts attention away from a main issue, there exists intentional choice. Nevertheless, it is a common situation to hear two people, in sincere disagreement, tell each other "you're not listening to what I'm saying . . . you missed the whole point. " Neither one intends to deceive, yet one person's main issue may be a side-issue to the other; each one unintentionally diverts the incoming main issue, treating it as a side-issue, "missing the point."

Opinions

Opinions are our personal beliefs, our subjective feelings, our judgments in favor or against something. Opinions are conclusions, based on some observed facts. Often opinions are formed very fast, very randomly, but they are conclusions based on a mass of incoming data that we see, hear, or otherwise sense. We quickly convert the conclusions into premises on which new reasoning takes place.

Once we form a strong opinion, then new incoming information gets flavored by it. Often, to defend opinions we now hold as "true," we adjust by filtering out new information which doesn't correspond to our held opinions.

George Lakoff emphasizes that "People think in frames.... If the facts do not fit a frame, the frame stays and the facts bounce off.... Concepts are not things that can be changed just by someone telling us the a fact. We may be presented with facts, but for us to make sense of them, they have to fit what is already in the synapses of the brain."

Opinions are treated here as the disputed borderline between those things which are generally agreed upon to be true and those which are generally agreed upon to be not true: most people will agree on the extremes.

The observer's interests and background influence not only the focus (the basic selection/omission process) but also the evaluation.

Puffery is the term commonly used today to describe what used to be called "seller's talk. " In defending puffery, advertisers frequently like to downplay any bad connotations by adding modifiers: "mere puffery" or "harmless puffery. " In The Great American Blow-Up, (1975), Ivan Preston, summarizing the legal history of puffery, states, "The law holds that people who act reasonably will automatically distrust puffery, will neither believe it or rely upon it, and therefore cannot be deceived by it. "

(Preston himself dissents, argues that puffery is deception, and seeks changes in the laws: "Puffery deceives, and the regulations which have made it legal are thoroughly unjustified.")

"By legal definition," Preston writes, "puffery is advertising or other sales representations which praise the item to be sold with subjective opinions, superlatives, or exaggerations, vaguely and generally, stating no specific facts." Universal generalizations about feelings, such as "everyone loves," or assertions that "you'll love . . . you'll feel ... just what you've always wanted" are usually permitted by law.

True claims about specific facts and measurable items present no problem. Some products and services are superior, the best in their category; sellers and workers certainly have justifiable pride in making truthful claims of such excellence. Even in cases where there might be an argument about excellence, sometimes, an honest enthusiasm, a kind of "esprit de corporation" might lead sellers to believe their own press releases. Extravagant claims may exist without the intent to deceive.

False claims are both illegal and immoral. There are some practical problems of detecting false claims. Until the late 1970s, the FTC efforts at checking claims were random and sporadic: advertisers frequently made unsubstantiated claims, withdrawing them only if their ads happened to be threatened with a "cease and desist" order. After the FTC started its systematic program to require advertisers to substantiate claims, it was swamped with masses of paperwork, the details and statistics needed to back up the claim. There is no simple solution to the practical problems of enforcing the law, but there's no disagreement that false claims are both illegal and immoral.

Most borderline problems of puffery occur with parity products (those with little or no differences) or with products, such as autos, in which the unmeasurable qualities of personal satisfactions are very important.

Puffery can be seen both as an opinion --- and as an "expected" fiction or hyperbole.

TRUE CLAIM ------------------- PUFFERY --------------------- FALSE CLAIM

Illusions

An illusion is a misinterpretation of something really existing (in contrast to a delusion-in which there's nothing really "out there"); the common usage of the term suggests falseness, but is ambiguous whether we have been mistaken or have been deceived.

Often, to be disillusioned is simply a recognition that our previously held beliefs were simply our opinions, and not the "truth." When we speak of someone whose illusions were shattered or destroyed, we're usually describing a situation in which the person had totally intensified the "good" and downplayed the "bad" of one's own position: a kind of self-deception, not realizing that there may be other ways at looking at the same reality.

The most likely things we are apt to have illusions about are those things which have been highly praised, intensified, idealized. Consider, for example, that many of our religious and patriotic ideals are taught by sincere adults to young children and are accepted, uncritically. A child often accepts opinions as "truth," and ideals as realities.

Later, when the person finds out that religious and political leaders have feet of clay, or that corruption exists, or that reasonable people disagree, some believers become disillusioned. A common reaction is overreaction: going to the other extreme, cynicism, an attack position which intensifies the "bad," denies the "good" of that which had previously been idealized.

Commercial advertising is also likely to cause disillusionment because ads intensify the "good," downplay the "bad." People who are most strongly antagonistic toward advertising are probably those who were once believers. Considering the way television toy commercials have hyped children in the past generation, there may be millions of people so affected: still cynical about advertising because of those broken promises from their childhood.

Errors

Errors are not lies. An error is unintentional; the human brain is capable of making mistakes. Incoming messages, for example, can be misunderstood due to noise, interruptions, ambiguity in the words or the signals; or the receivers might be impaired physically, slightly blind or deaf, mentally retarded, fatigued, limited in the language, or in their vocabulary. Even if none of these factors are present, people still make mistakes because of some inner "short circuits" in the brain. Such unintentional behavior is most dramatically seen as a result of drugs or chemical imbalance, but everyone experiences errors daily.

While some errors may be "Freudian slips," revealing, some repressed secret, most errors can be described almost in mechanical terms of standard sequences of actions. In some errors, we omit a step in a sequence ("slipped my mind," "forgot it"), or select an inappropriate step from another sequence (pick up a ringing phone and say "Come in").We can be focused or pre-occupied with one thing and block out other things; or we can lose focus, get distracted and forget what we were doing.

At times we can be overloaded, disorganized, scatterbrained, with many sequences out of order. When we speak, we can be tongue-tied or have mental blocks or transpose words (Spoonerisms, for example); we can have errors in hand-eye coordination (type the wrong letter), be awkward, clumsy, stumble, "trip over one's own feet," and so on.

All are evidences of little errors, wrong connections in our mental wiring. All of these things may affect the perception or transmission of the "truth" of a message, yet such unintentional errors are not considered ties.

If people are caught telling a lie, they often claim it was an error, that is, they downplay their own "bad" because it is commonly less serious to be guilty of an error than a lie.

Because there is difficulty in proving intent, we do have common phrases which are used to emphasize the innocence of the speaker's intention when an error has been committed, or to accuse another of a bad intention

Delusion, as used here, is restricted to mean that kind of error which is caused by a disorder in the nervous system, an abnormal psychotic condition of the mind. In contrast to "illusion," in which something "out there" is misinterpreted, with a delusion (or hallucination) there is nothing out there. A delusion has no basis in reality; the stimulus comes from within (e.g., the sensory hallucinations produced by LSD). However, psychoanalytical jargon ("delusions of grandeur," etc.) has been used so loosely in common speech that we're likely to hear the word used to describe any kind of fantasies, daydreams, illusions, or wishes about the future.

Fictions

Fictions are not lies. Fictions are stories and tales, plays and dramas, "made-up" products created by the human imagination. Fictions are not "true," but they have no intent to deceive.

The traditional theory of literature sees storytelling as a kind of imitation of life (mimesis), a representation or recreation of the experience of life in words. Fiction often claims a kind of universal truth, that such a thing could have happened, or that something similar has happened, or might happen under certain circumstances. Audiences recognize such "truth" in works well written, and often through literature, can gain new insights into their own lives.

Within the realm of storytelling, we can recognize extremes: at one end, we have fantasy stories of exotic, strange, improbable or impossible things which are obviously unreal; at the other end, we have realistic stories, with a sense of verisimilitude -the appearance of truth or reality.

In addition to stories, "fiction" here will include certain non-literal uses of words -- hyperbole, metaphor, and irony -- as ways we use language, not literally true, but without intent to deceive.

Literature has certain conventions, certain customs which are mutually recognized by writers and audiences. Conventions can involve the words used, or certain styles of writing appropriate to certain topics. In the drama, conventions involve all kinds of mutually-accepted stagecraft devices such as costumes, masks, scenery, stage whispers, asides, gestures, soliloquies, and so on. Deception is not involved here because of the audience's awareness, consent and approval. As Coleridge phrased it, we have a "willing suspension of disbelief" which allows us to have a literature of the imagination.

A minority opinion holds that fictions are lies. The Puritans, for example, in 1640 closed the English theaters as being the "devil's workshop" because they believed acting was lying. A small percentage of people, even today, consider all fairy tales and fictions (such as Santa Claus) as lies -- shameful and sinful.

A somewhat large number of people are literalists in language: while they may not object to stories (or give up watching movies and TV), they do insist on a literal interpretation of words (often involving the King James Version of the Bible) and have a hard time with hyperbole, metaphors, and irony.

However, even if the majority opinion is accepted, that we do have standard conventions, problems still arise because writers are notoriously clever and inventive, coming up with new ideas, breaking old conventions, and always making new borderline cases between fact and fiction, creating new areas which are not covered by such mutual awareness, consent, and approval. Are these borderline areas deceptive?

Borderline cases in literary works commonly cause trouble for critics. Anytime there is not a clear-cut distinction between fact and fiction, there is apt to be some kind of controversy about the borderline. The French term roman a clef is used, for example, to describe a novel closely based on real characters and incidents, often described as a thinly disguised fictionalized version with minor changes in names and places. Whenever a roman a clef is published, there's usually an argument over the key or the identifications.

While some frame devices (such as the "outside narrator" telling a story-within-a-story, or purported "editors" who "found the manuscript") are commonly recognized and accepted as fictions, other literary techniques generate arguments about "reality." When Truman Capote, for example, used the term "non-fiction fiction" to describe his book In Cold Blood, based on an actual murder case, critics recalled that Theodore Dreiser had used pages of verbatim courtroom transcripts worked into An American Tragedy, a half-century earlier. The blending of real and fictional characters and events (such as Doctorov's Ragtime, or Dos Passos' U.S.A. trilogy, or any number of historical romances) creates such borderline problems, leaving the reader unsure of what is "made up" and what is not.

The New Journalism (Tom Wolfe, and others) which blends observed facts together with the reporter's inferences, also creates borderline problems. So too, in any book based closely on psychoanalytical case-histories or case-studies, the clear-cut distinctions are gone.

In the movies and on television, "docu-dramas" present a fictionalized history which can seem very authentic because of the skillful use of camera techniques (grainy film, hand-held camera, etc.) In some cases, film footage and clips of the "real" thing are edited together with the dramatized portions so that it is almost impossible to separate illusion from reality.

In 1970, a newspaper survey indicated that some Americans did not believe that the moon landing had actually happened; they felt it had been faked by movie and television techniques, a political hoax to deceive the public. In 1978, a popular movie ("Capricorn One") used this as a basis for a story about NASA faking a Mars landing in order to keep their program (and budget) alive. In the future, borderline problems in fiction will probably become more complicated as technical ways to reproduce and imitate become more sophisticated.

Disclaimers are often required by law to identify works of fiction. In movies, for example, the printed disclaimer appears in the opening credits -- a long complex phrase in fine print that goes by so quickly it is hardly noticed -- which tells us that the work is fiction and "any similarity " to real people or real names is "purely coincidental."

Borderline cases in advertising occur in all of the media. Some television commercials, for example, appear to be program material: they look like news programs, interviews, or documentaries. Because of this blurring of the borderline between program and non-program material, the FCC has required some labeling of commercials ("Demonstration," "Dramatization"), but borderlines constantly change and disclosure regulations are not easy to formulate.

In print media, the borderline cases are those advertisements which look like news stories or editorial content in newspapers and magazines. These ads will use the same style, typeface, headlines, and photos with captions, in an apparent effort to deceive the reader into believing that an outsider was writing about the product. By law, these ads must carry a "slug line" notice ("Advertisement"), but this law is not very rigorously enforced.

Jokes are fictions, not meant to deceive. Americans are most accustomed to exaggeration: the tall tale, the stretcher, the whopper; British humor tends to understate. In both extremes, "truth" or "reality" is intensified or downplayed for humorous intent. We laugh at the incongruities, because we know things aren't really that way. The greater the exaggerated difference, the easier it is to recognize the humor.

A borderline case in humor is the "put-on" -- in which the message and intent are ambiguous. The audience is never quite sure whether it's "for real" or a joke: "are you putting me on?" In most kinds of kidding, the fun is in letting the victim know a trick has been played; but, the victim of a put-on never has certainty.

In informal conversation, a borderline case occurs with slightly exaggerated storytelling, not the deliberate, obvious exaggerations of a tall tale. Some people tend to exaggerate, inflate, embellish: intensify their own "good" and others' "bad."

War stories told by veterans, adventures told by travelers, sporting events recalled by fans are apt to select those details which intensify their "good" (their courage, skill, wit, endurance, etc.) or the opposing "bad" (the dangers, difficulties, etc.) Even everyday "adventures" are hyped up, to make them more exciting or more interesting (to the audience? to the storyteller?); such a tendency to make one's own stories (and life) more interesting is rather common. Historians soon learn to take eye-witness reports with a grain of salt.

Metaphors are not lies. Metaphors are fictional conventions. When we metaphorically say that something is something else ("He's a tiger" or "He's a chicken") we are not making a literal statement, but we are implying that one has certain qualities of the other.

Many products use metaphoric names, associating the product with something favorable. The names of automobiles, for example, are often selected for their connotations of speed, power, sleekness, freedom, vitality: Mustang, Maverick, Pinto, Cougar, Falcon, Skyhawk. (It's unlikely that Ford will ever feature a Sloth, Pig, Chicken or Turkey.) Such metaphors are not deceiving. When people go to a Ford dealer to buy a Mustang, they do not expect it, literally, to have hooves, eat hay, and neigh.

On the other hand, if people purchase something with the name or label "Natural Wool," "Genuine Leather," or a "Virginia ham," they do expect it to be a certain type and quality of product, and not a metaphoric use of the words. Such use would be deceptive: "literally misdescriptive names."

Laws concerning deceptive product names and labeling are often much stricter and more specific than laws about deceptive advertising in general. Names may not be literally misdescriptive; a substitute or synthetic may not be given a misleading name. Many strict regulations exist, for example, regarding names of wines, liquors, foods: "Virginia ham" must be ham raised and processed in Virginia; the term "cognac" is restricted to brandy distilled in the Cognac region of France; "Roquefort" to that high-quality cheese made in the village of Roquefort. In actual practice, many restaurants violate these laws by listing "Roquefort dressing" on their menu when they are really serving a less-expensive blue cheese. Some cities have tried to write Truth-in-Menu ordinances to prohibit this kind of fraud, passing off frozen vegetables as "fresh," microwave meals as "home cooking."

Hyperboles are not lies. Hyperboles are fictional conventions, figures of speech usually defined in terms of "extravagant exaggerations." If we say that we have a "million things to do today," or if a seller offers "mile-high" ice-cream cones or a pocketknife with "thousands of uses," we recognize these overstatements as hyperboles. The law generally rules that hyperboles are not deceptive; in fact, sellers are on safer legal grounds with such great exaggerations than with tittle overstatements closer to the borderline of deception: to claim that a 4-blade pocketknife had 6 blades would be false and deceptive; to claim that it had "thousands of uses" would not be deceptive. McDonald's got in trouble with the FTC once about the exact weight claims for its "Quarter-Pounder" hamburger, whereas Burger King is not likely to have any problem using the vague claim implied in a "Whopper."

Irony is not a lie. Irony is a fictional convention, a figure of speech: to say one thing and mean another, usually the exact opposite of the literal meaning. Irony involves a double-message in which the nonverbal elements (tone of voice, inappropriate context, use of quotation marks) overshadow the verbal.

Irony depends on an aware audience. Ironic remarks can go over the head of an unaware audience: for example, children, speakers of a foreign language, readers of obscure satiric literature. Irony can be missed, can be misinterpreted; receivers can be uncertain if the message is ironic or straight ("Are you putting me on?"). However, the usual intent of irony is to emphasize, to be witty, to criticize, to express displeasure -- but not to deceive.

Imitations

Imitation repeats the composition pattern of something else. We can imitate, reproduce, mimic, mock, feign, simulate, copy anything else, including actions. Although the word "imitation" (in contrast to "real," "original," "genuine," "authentic") has negative overtones of something "inferior" or "deceptive," people have always done a great deal of imitating and copying, most of which has value and is not deceptive.

Imitation can be deceptive. Anything can be imitated; anything of value is often imitated with intent to deceive. It's not the act of imitating, but the intent and attempt to pass it off as original which constitutes deception. Obvious examples of imitation with intent to deceive would be such frauds as counterfeit money (or stocks, bonds, documents, stamps, licenses, admission tickets, etc.); forgery (of signatures on checks, documents); art forgeries, fake antiques, or "paste" diamonds being sold as authentic; plagiarism.

Most fraud laws are concerned with theft by deception or misrepresentation. Because the intent to deceive is often hard to prove, some laws state that the mere possession of certain imitations (e.g. counterfeit money) is sufficient evidence to establish guilty intent.

In contrast to these rather clear-cut examples of imitations with intent to deceive, there's a complex and difficult borderline area involving problems of imitation and copying. The whole area of laws concerning copyrights and patents is very complicated. The 1978 Copyright Law, for example, was nearly a decade in preparation (and it appears it will be more decades in the courts) trying to define the rights of individuals and society in the copying of information.

Suggestions

Most communication is implicit, suggested, not specifically stated. In person-to-person speech-and in its electronic extension, television, we imply most of our meanings. Most of these suggestions are probably nonverbal: the facial expressions (smiles, frowns), body gestures (shrugs, waving, pointing), the pauses and pacing of our speech, the dress and ornaments worn, the possessions displayed (cars, homes), the location and context of our messages.

Even most of our verbal transactions are made up of fragments of sentences, brief words ("you know . . you know . .") which, together with eye-contact, or the situation, send messages which the person "completes" as they are being received.

Such implicit communication leads our audience to make the final step, to "jump to a conclusion. " The speaker sets up a common or expected sequence of thought, but does not totally complete the sequence. Or, we set a common or expected pattern or context, leaving the audience "to fill in the blanks," or put the pieces of the puzzle together.

Most implied language requires cooperation, an action by the receiver, who infers, makes an inference, completing the logical sequence or pattern which had been implied, suggested. Because we normally spend our lives doing such routine completing of sequences, it's very common to "jump to conclusions." Implicit messages can be either truthful or deceptive, but we normally don't consider jumping to conclusions a problem -- except when we are deceived.

We speak in such shorthand very commonly, implying more than we actually say explicitly, and most of our implications are not deceptive. But, just as any explicit statement can be a lie by intent, so also any implicit communication can be intended to deceive.

In terms of persuasion, the association technique is frequently used as a way of suggesting. The persuader need not explicitly state a relationship: simply by placing the product (or person, etc.) together with something already desired by or loved by the intended audience (or hated or feared, if "attack" propaganda), the associative link is made. Such suggestions can be truthful, or deceptive.

Just as words can have multiple meanings, so also implied messages such as nonverbal gestures can have multiple meanings. Although most people do learn to "read" and "understand" such implicit messages, we don't have the same degree of clarity in defining them as we do with words. Although there is a growing interest in the topic, "dictionaries" of nonverbal gestures are still in their infancy.

Implied language requires co-operation, an action by the receiver, who infers, makes an inference, completing the logical sequence or pattern which had been implied, suggested by the sender.

Because we normally spend our lives doing such routine completing of sequences, it's very common to "jump to conclusions."

Implicit messages can be either truthful or deceptive, but we normally don't consider "jumping to conclusions" a problem -- except when we are deceived. Many students confuse these two important words (imply / infer). Here are some other ways to express it:

In language usage today, most of what we call "evasion" has bad connotations; to be evasive is to be "slippery as an eel," "hard to pin down," or someone who uses "weasel words. "

Most evasions can be described here as omissions (silence, half-truths) or diversions ("changing the subject," jargon, ambiguous words or phrasing, vague abstractions, double messages, etc.).

In addition, there are certain qualifiers, words which stress uncertainty:
maybe, perhaps, possibly, sometimes, may, might, guess, estimate, in some cases.

Consider the spontaneous evasions, unpremeditated, which might occur if an angry father were to ask his teen-age son, "Did you take the car last night?" In this example, "no' would be a lie.

Don't underestimate the potential complexity of evasion. This example of a son, threatened, evading the question of an angry father simply suggests some of the quick answers, unpremeditated spontaneous replies that might occur. If so many evasive answers about a simple situation can come so quickly from an unprepared amateur, consider also that sophisticated professionals, involved in complex situations, with prior knowledge, preparation, and planning, can produce some very complicated evasions -- which are sometimes deceptive.

People can deceive with evasions. In courtrooms, for example, witnesses under oath and afraid of lying (which would be perjury) might use deceptive evasions, claiming loss of memory ("I can't recall") or stressing vague memory ("As I recollect now . . . to the best of my memory"), or non-responsibility or non-awareness ("I was too drunk"), or any excuse to conceal intent to deceive.

In political situations, people have used evasive tactics to deceive. In recent years, presidents and others have used "executive privilege" and have invoked secrecy, National Security, Higher Authority ("I'm not at liberty to tell you . . . I can't release that information") as deceptive excuses to evade questioning. For example, Congressional investigations of White House actions are often long delayed by evasions and legal manuevers (e.g. official investigations into the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, and V-P Richard Cheney's secret meetings about energy policy in 2000 are still stalled, after almost 3 years).

When evasion is used to deceive, it's often not effective. Some people, for example, if they receive an evasive answer will infer (correctly or incorrectly) that the evasion is deceptive.

Evasion is not necessarily deceptive. People do evade direct responses for reasons other than deception, reasons they would call prudence, caution, discretion, flexibility -- keeping your options open. "

Evasion can often be an appropriate response. One of the "counter-propaganda axioms," for example, recommends "when they intensify, downplay." An evasive answer is a form of downplaying, frequently an appropriate response when pressured by a seller who seeks to close a sale. The seller seeks closure, a "straight" yes-or-no answer; but we often evade: "I'll have to ask my wife . . . I'll have to see my husband about it." Evasion? Yes. Deception? Depends on the intent.

Politicians and diplomats are frequently criticized for their evasive answers. But many evasions are very appropriate in order to avoid simplistic thinking or dangerous consequences. Many news reporters use "leading questions," for example, to try to lead politicians into a yes/no response to a complex question. If a reporter were to ask a presidential candidate during an election campaign "Would you ever use the H Bomb?" -- a simple yes or no answer would lead to headlines: JONES WOULD USE BOMB or JONES WOULD NEVER USE BOMB.

Most experienced politicians would reply with qualifications ("Under certain circumstances . . .") or hypotheticals ("If the situation were . . ."), appropriate evasions in response to questions which omit qualifications, oversimplify complex issues.

The use of vague abstractions also allows flexibility. In a threat situation, for example, it's often better for a diplomat to threaten a vague "appropriate action" than to specify a specific response ("We'll bomb Moscow"). This vagueness gives both sides some leeway to compromise without losing face or being forced to go ahead with the threat.

Intrusive questions into the private lives of some public figures would be another example of a reasonable use of evasive answers ("no comments") as a way of protecting a right of privacy.

Everyone agrees that there are times when a specific, direct statement is necessary. But fewer people recognize that there are times when a vague or evasive answer is also appropriate. Some readers might prefer a blanket condemnation of evasion. But evasion is a human behavior, sometimes appropriate to a situation, sometimes effective, sometimes with no intent to deceive, sometimes deceptive for a "good" purpose.

Evasions in time are common: stalling for time, delaying tactics, preventing closure. Many legal maneuvers are designed to stall; sometimes this can be draining on the opponent who does not have the money or endurance. Lawyers who "have the meter running" may not care how long it takes to settle a case. Yet, all time delays need not be evil, wasteful, or deceptive; certainly there are situations in which it is reasonable and proper to "take a break," "let things cool down," or "let the dust settle."

Promises And Threats

Promises and threats about the future can be deceptive or not, again, it is the intent which is important. The common problems involved in such future promises are usually related to not fulfilling a promise, or contradicting it. Both of these could be intentionally deceptive. However, there could be other factors involved: inability (impotency, weakness, people sometimes promise more than they can deliver); circumstances (accidents do happen, times change, this is not a static world); errors (mistakes in judgment, planning, execution).

Deceptive intent may be difficult to prove. But reasonable people can make other judgments about promises or threats involving the future. We judge such things on our estimate of their reasonableness, on the ability to be fulfilled under normal conditions. Desire alone ("wishful thinking") does not guarantee a future event. If someone does not have the means to an end, the power and the opportunity, then we dismiss such foolish promises and idle threats.

Borderline problems concerning errors usually are about issues of responsibility and culpable ignorance. Responsibility involves a duty, obligation, or legal liability because of (1) the job, role, or function of someone; (2) their training, experience, or expertise; (3) their receipt of benefits, usually money.

Responsibility can be established in many different ways (law, custom, prior agreement, contract, consent), but basically the key questions are: Was it your job? Did you know how to do it? Were you getting paid to do it? The most common excuses to defend an error are usually: "It wasn't my job" (denying responsibility) or "I didn't know" (ignorance). "You should have known," is the common response. If you function in the job, and receive the benefits, then you have the obligation to know, otherwise it is culpable ignorance.

Good Intentions ... Bad Results

Opinions, errors, and fictions have been treated here in terms of their non-intent to deceive; the essence of lies and other deceptions is in the intent to deceive. Digging deeper into human motives we can ask: "Why do people intend to deceive others?"

The assumption here is that people seek to gain a benefit, either as a defensive measure or as offensive attack. Deception, which is successful or effective, does give the deceiver an advantage both in defense and offense.

What is an advantage to one person, may not be to another. What is an advantage to an individual, may be a disadvantage to the society.

Thus, societies have strong codes against deception to protect the common good. There would be many more frauds, tricks, lies, and deceptions if there were not laws and penalties established to deter individuals from taking advantage of others. It's easy to see the bad intentions involved in such aggressive exploitation as deliberately deceptive advertising, or frauds, or con games. But, if we exclude these extreme cases, we find that most lies are told with good intentions. Good intentions, however, may have bad results.

Certain situations increase the potential for deception. In defensive situations, the greater the threat, the more likely people are to use lies and deceptions in their defense. To reduce deception, reduce the threat. In everyday situations, it's common to hear people who are seeking the truth to guarantee safety to other persons: "I promise I won't hit you . . . won't be mad at you . . . if you tell me the truth." In criminal law, it's common practice to grant immunity to certain key witnesses to gain their truthful testimony by reducing a threat.

In attack situations, the reverse tactics are useful. Aggression is more likely to occur in situations in which it will be most successful, that is, where a gain can be made without danger to the aggressor.

Therefore, to reduce aggressive deception, increase the threat or penalty, make it more risky for the deceiver. Society, through governments, can create strong deterrents against aggressive deception by strong individuals or groups: fraud laws and the regulations against deceptive advertising are good examples. A great deal of progress has been made in the recent past and such appropriate efforts should continue.

Less has been done, however, to reduce the aggressive deceptions by governments abusing power. Although the stakes may be higher, we have relatively fewer controls. While some progress has been made recently in terms of disclosure laws (Freedom of Information Act, reforms of classified secrets, etc.), we don't have adequate laws or penalties to cope with the aggressive lies which can be told by politicians and bureaucrats.

White Lies

"White lies" suggest lies about trivial matters -- fibs -- or harmless lies told for good purposes: benevolent lies, for the benefit of others, and paternalistic lies.

Benevolent lies are often related to civility, the care and consideration for the feelings of others. Examples of such lies, which promote a general social bonding, include: polite social formulas ("nice to see you"); polite false excuses ("I can't go tomorrow," instead of "I don't want to"); flattery ("you look so nice today"); polite false gratitude ("just what I always wanted"); placebos (given by doctors); inflated grades (given by teachers, as the norm goes up); and pro forma letters of recommendation ("outstanding work").

Paternalistic lies are those told to protect, to shield, to comfort, to encourage, to stroke, to nurture, to defend young children from harsh truths and realities with which they're not yet able to cope.

Other lies with good intentions include lying for self-defense, to protect one's own right of privacy, to ward off unwarranted requests and illegitimate questions. Bok speaks of mutual deceits, of a "quite common, often poignant human arrangement," in which people, by mutual understanding, knowingly continue a serious game of deceit: "Most friendships and families rely upon some such reciprocity to sustain illusions, suppresses some memory too painful to confront, and give support where it is needed."

All of these examples of well-intentioned lies are quite common in everyday life. We need not think of extreme situations (lying to a murderer seeking information, lying to save a life, etc.) to demonstrate what Aquinas termed "helpful" lies.

Assume that every lie can be defended, by the liar, as having good intentions.

Benevolence and justice are the two major defenses that most people will use to explain their reasons for lying and deception. These two reasons apply not only to the common excuses offered for everyday "white lies," but also to the elaborate rationales concocted by business and political leaders explaining their reasons for wholesale deception.

Benevolence, here, means that the liar's intention is to do good or avoid evil. Self-defense, survival, preservation are often claimed as the basis for a lie: "if I didn't say that, then harm would have come to me." However, usually such an excuse is accompanied by an emphasis on altruistic motives: the "self" has been extended to include a wider group-family, friends, kin, group, nation. When people lie, they usually claim that they are selflessly doing good for the benefit of the wider group.

Political lies, for example, are often defended, by the liars, in terms of "national security," "national defense," "national unity," "party unity," and so on. Commercial lies (or "occupational lies") such as deceptive advertising, are often rationalized in terms of "keeping the system going," of "just doing one's job ... doing what I'm told. " The on-the-job liar also seeks to avoid evil -- losing a job, perhaps. The greater good of the whole is used by many people within corporations or organizations, a kind of plea to a higher law justifying that any lies they tell will basically or eventually be doing good for the organization, or the wider society.

Justice is the other basic defense of the liar. Everyone is in favor of justice. Everyone defends their own positions as being fair, and, in conflict situations, defends their own actions as seeking an equality which is just. But each claims that the other side violates justice.

The "Haves" seek to maintain balance, to preserve the status quo, the way things "should be." To them, others are unjustly seeing to upset justice, to destroy, to usurp, to take away that which they have earned, worked for and deserve, their "just rewards." The "Have-Nots" seek for a justice which they feel has been denied to them; the "Have-nots" want fairness, justice, and their "just rewards," too. In this situation, everyone can defend their lies by claiming that the deception was done in the ultimate service of justice. Retribution ("an eye for an eye") also implies the element of justice: we punish people, seek retribution, give our enemies "what they deserve," all in the name of justice.

Political lies often involve additional factors, such as a sense of duty, frequently a sense of crisis, and, concerning lies from the leaders, a sense of superiority. The sense of duty that people have when working for a country or a "cause" is much more intense than the mere occupational task of doing a job. People involved in a "cause" (political, religious, racial) with great emotional meaning to them are apt to justify deceptions almost as a solemn duty or obligation. In many political situations, the sense of crisis or urgency also is used to defend lying: "If we had more time, we'd be able to give out the real information . . . the time isn't right now . . . the situation is too delicate . . . history will confirm the wisdom of our decisions."

The sense of superiority is frequently found in the justifications given by political leaders to defend their lies. While this might be expected from a dictator or a tyrant, it's especially inappropriate and ironical coming from the elected leaders of democratic countries.

Yet, recent American presidents have given ample evidence of this elitist feeling of superiority, a smug paternalism, that the leaders are justified in lying to the people because the leaders have greater understanding, insight, knowledge, and judgment. The common people are seen as unsophisticated, unable to cope with bad news, unable to understand or respond appropriately, too emotional, too ignorant to see the big picture. Thus, our leaders lie to us, with good intentions.

In The Politics of Lying, (1973) David Wise claims that the major political development in recent years has been the growth of systematic deception of the American people by its own leaders and government. From the U2 affair in Eisenhower's administration to the early days of Nixon's Watergate affair, the book focuses on the growth of deceptive practices and the changing relationships of the government and the people.

Wise points out the danger of this tendency: "The consent of the governed is basic to American democracy. If the governed are misled, if they are not told the truth, or if through official secrecy and deception they lack information on which to base intelligent decisions, the system may go on-but not as a democracy. After nearly two hundred years, this may be the price America pays for the politics of lying. "

President Lyndon Johnson's lies about his strategy in Vietnam certainly contributed to his election victory in 1964; Barry Goldwater had been labeled the war candidate, while Johnson made promises of peace, in lies which were not exposed until the famous Pentagon Papers were released years later.

In Lying, Bok uses the example of LBJ as a crucial moral and political problem: "President Johnson thus denied the electorate any chance to give or to refuse consent to the escalation of the war in Vietnam. Believing they had voted for the candidate of peace, American citizens were, within months, deeply embroiled in one of the cruelest wars in their history. Deception of this kind strikes at the very essence of democratic government, It allows those in power to override or nullify the right vested in the people to cast an informed vote in critical elections. Deceiving the people for the sake of the people is a self-contradictory notion in a democracy."

Every recent political and governmental deception has been defended, by the liars, in terms of good intentions: doing good, avoiding evil, seeking justice and fairness, doing one's duty in a crisis, knowing better than others -what's really best for the country.

The deceived public, however, has not expressed a reciprocal gratitude for being lied to and deceived. When the lies are exposed, most people are outraged that the leaders have betrayed the public trust. From the outside, the liar's "good intentions" are seen to be self-serving rationalizations to retain power, to cover up errors, embarrassments, vindictiveness, corruption, minor vices and major abuses.

Two common reactions to political lies are vague indignation and cynical resignation.

Cynical resignation leads some people to shrug their shoulders, and say that "nothing can be done ... all politicians lie anyway." Vague indignation leads some people to quick anger that "something ought to be done," which often turns to frustration when complex problems do not yield quick and easy solutions.

Both extremes can be avoided. In a democracy, we can make progress, or at least move toward an equilibrium to counterweight the problems of political deception. We can reward genuine honesty and candor of political leaders who admit to doubt and difficulties. We can support legislation which encourages openness in government and that which penalizes deception. We can value a free press and the essential role of the investigative journalist, the reformer, and the gadfly.

We can teach young citizens the realities of human rationalizations. The more citizens, for example, who know the patterns and probabilities that "national security" and "good intentions" will be dragged out to support every lie, the less likely the excuse will be effective.

Deception, like violence, has always been a part of the human condition. To recognize this does not endorse deception nor justify inaction. We do take actions to control violence, to reduce the degree, to limit the kinds, to reduce the causes and ameliorate the effects.

Although violence exists, and "everybody does it," we do not simply shrug our shoulders and say "nothing can be done about it." So also we can take actions to reduce deception within our society.

If a democratic society is to remain free, citizens should not be encouraged to be docile, trusting, and naive. If any statement can be a lie, any behavior deceptive, and all lies and deceptions defended for their good intentions, we're not likely to find simple solutions.

Our best defense may be in our ability to analyze language, to make critical judgments, to transform vague trust or distrust into specific acceptance or rejection. We can do this better if we are more aware of the borderlines, more conscious to distinguish lies and deception from errors, opinions, and fictions; if we recognize the common situations in which deceptions are more probable, and the common excuses and justifications offered by the deceivers.